Israel must adopt a policy of maximum pressure on the Lebanese government, mainly through the US administration, with the goal of preventing Iran’s involvement and isolating Hezbollah by ending its “people-state” role. Opinion.
On January 26, the 60-day ceasefire between Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah ended. A ceasefire extension until February 18th was announced last night, following clashes that continued throughout the day between IDF forces remaining in Lebanon and Lebanese attempting to return to villages in southern Lebanon. On the Lebanese side, the Ministry of Health reported over 20 casualties.
We estimate that Hezbollah operatives were physically present on the ground, mingled indistinguishably among the returnees. Throughout the convoys of returnees, Hezbollah flags and posters of Nasrallah, the former Hezbollah leader, were visible everywhere.
On the Israeli side—in areas adjacent to the border, most residents are currently refraining from returning to their homes, as it is unclear whether the Lebanese government will uphold its commitment to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River as per UN Resolution 1701. According to the ceasefire agreement, the IDF was supposed to completely withdraw from Lebanon yesterday, while the Lebanese army was supposed to deploy in all areas adjacent to the border, together with UNIFIL, and begin the process of disarming Hezbollah.
Implications:
Hezbollah seeks to incite conflict and orchestrate incidents that result in harm to the Lebanese. This is classic fuel for Hezbollah’s propaganda campaign: “Lebanese citizens want to return to their land and must be protected…” From Hezbollah’s perspective, this strengthens their justification for their presence, arguing that the Lebanese army is unable to adequately protect the “civilians” on its own. The equation of “the people-army-resistance” is more relevant than ever… Hezbollah presents the situation as an aid to the Lebanese army.
In parallel, the new president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, issued a statement that avoided addressing the breaches of the LAF’s barriers by Hezbollah supporters.
Implications:
Hezbollah seeks to incite conflict and orchestrate incidents that result in harm to the Lebanese. This is classic fuel for Hezbollah’s propaganda campaign: “Lebanese citizens want to return to their land and must be protected…” From Hezbollah’s perspective, this strengthens their justification for their presence, arguing that the Lebanese army is unable to adequately protect the “civilians” on its own. The equation of “the people-army-resistance” is more relevant than ever… Hezbollah presents the situation as an aid to the Lebanese army.
The pictures of the events with the Shiite base waving Hezbollah flags and Nasrallah’s pictures are a platform to reinforce the “picture of victory” that Hezbollah so desperately wants to present to internal public opinion in Lebanon.
